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THE DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS
Aubrey M. Daniel, lI*t
Introduction

T

HE court-martial and premeditated murder conviction of First
Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., for his participation in the My
Lai Massacre on March 16, 1968, was one of the most controversial crim-

inal trials, either military or civilian, in the history of this nation. Although the trial brought to the surface many troubling aspects of this
country's conduct of the Vietnam War, the primary focus of the controversy centered on the question of whether an American soldier should be
held criminally accountable for his participation in the mass execution
of unarmed and unresisting men, women, children and babies taken captive by him during the course of a military operation, if he did so in
obedience to orders from a superior officer. Highlighting the issue, one
writer who covered the trial wrote:
Hovering over the My Lai Massacre cases is a storm cloud of menacing
implications from a question that many professional soldiers would
just as soon ignore:
Is the modem-day GI supposed to be an unquestioning myrmidon
to his leaders-or a reasoning individual with an obligation, and the
guts, to disobey an order he decides is illegal.
Until My Lai publicly revived the question, it was widely assumed
that the Nuremberg Trials after World War II had issued the universal
answer and finally put the matter to rest. The principles of Nuremberg
which were adopted by the United Nations, gave international recognition to the concept that an individual may be held responsible for a
war crime even if he committed it under orders from his superior or
his government.
Yet it's become increasingly clear that a lot of Americans either are
not aware of that principle of international law, do not agree with it,
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or fail to see in it any relevance to what happened at My Lai 4 on
March 16, 1968.1
In defense of his conduct in the village of My Lai 4, Lieutenant Calley
testified:
Well, I was ordered to go in there and detroy the enemy. That was
my job on that day. That was the mission I was given. I did not sit
down and think in terms of men, women, and children. They were all
classified the same, and that was the classification we dealt with, just
as enemy soldiers.
I felt then and I still do that I acted as I was directed and I carried
out2 the orders that I was given, and I do not feel wrong in doing so,
sir.

When the military court rejected this plea and sentenced Lieutenant
Calley to life imprisonment, the American public reacted in overwhelming opposition to the conviction. This resulted in President Nixon's intervention on April 1, 1971, and his order to release Lieutenant Calley
from confinement one day after the sentence had been imposed.3 At
1 Green, In the Heat of Battle, Orders Are Orders, But When Can a Soldier Say No?,
The National Observer, January 18, 1971, at 24.
2
Testimony of Lieutenant William L. Galley, Jr., Ft. Benning, Georgia, February 22,
1971.
Based on the testimony of Lieutenant Calley and other evidence concerning the orders
for the operation, the military judge instructed the jury on the defense of obedience to
orders. His instructions on this issue are set out in full in an Appendix to this article
and are discussed more fully at p. 504 infra.
Lieutenant Calley's conviction was affirmed by a panel of the United States Court
of Military Review on February 16, 1973. CM 426402, Calley, C.M.R. (1973).
The court found the trial judge's instructions on obedience to orders to be entirely
correct and further observed, after a thorough examination of the evidence of the
orders given, that if the jury found that Calley had fabricated his claim, their finding
had abundant support in the record.
3 A poll was taken by George Gallup to assess the public's reaction. The questions and
answers were as follows:
Do you approve or disapprove of the court-martial finding that Lt. Calley is guilty
of premeditated murder?
Approve
9%
Disapprove: 79%
No opinion: 12%
Do you disapprove of the verdict because you think what happened at My Lai was
not a crime or because you think others besides Lt. Calley share the responsibility for
what happened?
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least part of the reason for the public response was evidenced by the
poll conducted by Louis Harris in January of 1970, which sought to
determine the public's attitude toward the defense of superior orders.
Those questioned were asked to put themselves in the positions of soldiers ordered to shoot old men, women and children. When asked if
they would consider it "more right" to follow the orders or "more
right" to disobey them, 37 percent selected the first alternative and 45
percent the latter. Two-thirds of those sampled thought soldiers who
participated in the massacre "should be let off if they proved they did
the killing under orders." The sample's attitude toward the Nuremberg
principle of individual culpability was equally divided, with 39 percent
agreeing and 39 percent in disagreement. This represents a dramatic
change in public opinion on this issue since 1947, the year the Nuremberg Trials were held, when the vast majority of the public felt that
the Nazi war criminals should not escape punishment because of obedience to orders.4
[Based on those who disapproved]
Not a crime: 20%
Share responsibility: 71%
No opinion: 9%
Do you think Lt. Calley is being made the scapegoat for the actions of others above
him, or not?
Yes: 69%
No: 12%
No opinion: 19%
Do you approve or disapprove of President Nixon's decision to release Lt. Calley
pending appeal of his conviction?
Approve: 83%
Disapprove: 7%
No opinion: 10%
Do you think the incident for which Lt. Calley was tried was an isolated incident or
a common one?
Isolated: 24%
Common: 50%
No opinion: 26%
New York Times, April 4, 1971, at 56, col. 3, Gallup.
4 On April 27, 1947, a poll was conducted in which the sample was asked,
After the war, what do you think should be done with members of the Nazi
party who defend themselves by claiming that they committed crimes under orders
of higher-ups in the Party?
The following responses were obtained:
2%
None of our affair
19%
Trials
3%
Re-educate
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It is not the purpose of this article to undertake an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for this change in attitude or the public's reaction to the
Calley verdict, but rather, in light of the case and the interest it has
aroused, to examine the historical development and precedent for the
defense of superior orders in American jurisprudence, and to discuss
some of the practical problems involved in the application of that
standard.
Historical Development of the Standard
Despite an apparent popular belief, the defense of obedience to superior orders, i.e., that the acts charged to a defendant were committed
pursuant to orders from military or civilian superiors to whom a duty of
obedience was owed, was not first raised and litigated at the Nuremberg
Trials, and is not only a principle of international law but a recognized
principle of American jurisprudence. The effect of superior orders on
an individual's responsibility for his conduct, and the moral question
implicit within that concept, i.e., under what circumstances will an individual be deemed to be an unthinking instrumentality of the state, relieved of his normal obligation to exercise individual thought and make
appropriate moral decisions, is one that has been debated for centuries.
The earliest articulations of views came not from courts of law, but
from philosophers. Saint Augustine observed:
[A] n unjust order may perhaps render the king responsible, while the
duty of obedience preserves the innocence of the soldier.5
Others were less willing to allow individuals to avoid the consequences
of their acts. Grotius observed:
Imprisonment

42%

Kill them
Other answers

19%
15%

AIPO Poll, quoted in W. Boscm, JUDGMENr ON NUREMBERG, 91-92 (1970). Compare
also Bosch's study showing that 75% of the American public, 69% of the newspaper
columnists, 73% of the newspapers and 75% of the periodicals approved of the Nuremberg trials. Id. at 109.

5 Quoted in Marcin, Individual Conscience Under Military Compulsion, 57 A.B.AJ.
1222 (1971).
To the same effect, the Municiple Law of Rome: "He does the injury they say who
orders that it be done; there is then no guilt on him that has to obey," and Tacitus: "To
the Prince the gods have given the supreme right of decision; for a subject there remains
the glory of obedience." Id. at 1222-23.
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If those under the rule of another are ordered to take the field, as often

occurs, they should altogether refrain6 from so doing if it is clear to
them that the cause of the war is unjust.
As the philosophers have been unable to agree on the superior-orders
defense, so too have the courts been of differing minds. The earliest decisions had little difficulty in finding that obedience to superior orders
was not a defense; however, these cases did not deal exclusively with
military considerations, and political circumstances surrounding the
trials doubtlessly influenced the decisions. For example, in 1474 Peter
von Hagenbach, a German governor, tried for perpetrating a reign of
terror in the name of Duke Charles "The Bold" of Burgundy, raised the
plea: "Is it not known that soldiers owe absolute obedience to their superiors?" 7 The plea was not successful and von Hagenbach was beheaded.
And, in Axtell's Case," Axtell, the commander of the guards at the execution of Charles I, was tried for and convicted of murder and treason
despite his plea that all "he did was as a soldier, by the command of his
superior officer, whom he must obey or die." In rejecting this defense,
the court reasoned that:
his superior was a traitor, and all that joined him in that act were
traitorous and did by that approve the treason; and where the command was traitorous, there the obedience to that command is also
traitorous. 9

Although not expressed in these terms, the principle underlying the
von Hagenbach and Axtell decisions is that while it is the soldier's duty
to obey lawful orders, the soldier also has a duty to disobey unlawful
orders, and his failure to do so ipso facto will subject him to criminal
61d. at 1223. Also, Francisci de Victoria, a Sixteenth Century Spanish theologian and
professor, wrote, "if a subject is convinced of the injustice of the war, he ought not
to serve in it, even on the command of a prince." VicroRA, ON THE LAW or WAR, 173
(Classics of International Law ed., 1917).
7 1 SCHWARTZENBERGFR, INTERNATioNAL LAW, 308-10 (2d ed., 1949).
8 84 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1660). See also Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (C. P. 1774),
where Lord Mansfield recalled a case in which a Naval Captain had been found civilly
liable for following the orders of the Admiral when he pulled down the houses of some
settlers on the coast of Nova Scotia, noting that the representatives of the Admiral
defended the cause and paid the damages; and Keighly v. Dell, 176 Eng. Rep. 781
(C.P. 1866).
9 84 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1660).
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accountability. This statement of the legal standard is expressive of the
standard as it was first adopted in American jurisprudence soon after
the birth of the nation. The earliest American decision involving the
defense of superior orders was a civil case, Little v. Barreme,10 which
arose out of the hostilities between France and the United States at the
end of the eighteenth century. Congress had passed a non-intercourse act
that authorized the President to order the Navy to seize any American
vessel bound to a French port. The President implemented the act by
an executive order that exceeded the Congressional grant of authority
by ordering Navy captains to seize American vessels bound to and from
French ports. Captain Little, relying upon the executive order, seized a
Danish ship not bound to a French port, and was subsequently sued for
damages by the ship's owners. Little attempted to rely on the President's
orders in defense of his action. Chief Justice Marshall, in rejecting the
orders as a defense, confessed that his initial bias was that the orders of
the executive, while not giving a right, might provide Captain Little
with an excuse, because
[i]mplicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of
their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appears to me strongly to imply the principle that those
orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person
whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws
of his country in a situation which in general requires that he should
obey them.
However, he rejected his initial bias and held, as a matter of law, that
the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize
an act which, without those instructions, would have been a plain
trespass."'
Chief Justice Marshall of course recognized, in wrestling with the question, the inherent problem with deciding whether a superior order should
provide an absolute defense. That is,
when a soldier is confronted with an [illegal] order to perform an act
constituting a criminal offence, the demands of military discipline, as
10 1 U.S. (2
1 Id.

Cranch) 465, 467 (1804).
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expressed in the duty of obedience to superior orders, come into conflict with the imperative need to preserve the supremacy of the law
as manifested in the proscriptions of criminal law: military discipline
the supremacy of law
requires unflinching compliance with orders;
12
proscribes the commission of criminal acts.
The rule of Little v. Barreme was first applied in a criminal case in
United States v. Bright,13 where a state militiaman, pursuant to orders
from the Governor of Pennsylvania, interfered with a federal marshal
in the performance of his duties. The court rejected the militiaman's
defense of superior orders, citing Little v. Barreme and saying:
In a state of open and public war, where military law prevails, and
the peaceful voice of military law is drowned in the din of arms, great
indulgences must necessarily be extended to the acts of subordinate
officers done in obedience to the orders of their superiors. But even
there the order of a superior officer to take the life of a citizen, or to
invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive him of his property,
would not shield the inferior against a charge of murder or trespass, in
14
the regular judicial tribunals of the country.
As one can see, these early decisions dogmatically rejected the superior-orders defense if the order on which the subordinate relied was
illegal in the abstract sense, without regard to the order's appearance of
legality to the subordinate. The first decision to include within the
standard a consideration of the state of mind of the actor and the reason12

Y. DzNsEIN, TmE

DEFENSE OF OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

6.
13 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809).
14 United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, at 1237-38 (1809). Other cases, along with
Brigbt, recognized that some sort of indulgence should exist for the military, given the
exigencies of the military. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Whear) 537 (1827). In
United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816), the court recognized the
importance of discipline and the fact that civilian tribunals could not fully understand
military needs, and felt therefore that courts should not apply too exacting a standard
to military orders. But, the court further said:
[Tlhis can only be when those rules and orders are consistent with law, and not
when they are against the express provisions of law, and against natural justice.
Id. at 1140.
However, many cases did not even give lip service to special rules for the military.
United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813):
No military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the laws of his
country; nor will such a command excuse, much less justify the act. Id. at 657;
and Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns (N.Y.) 521 (1814).

484
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6 In
ableness of his reliance upon the order was United States v. Jones."
Jones, the crew of an American privateer was charged with piracy for
stopping a neutral vessel, assaulting her captain and crew, and stealing
certain merchandise. The court rejected the claim that the crew acted
pursuant to the orders of the captain:

This doctrine, equally alarming and unfounded, . . . is repugnant to
reason, and to the positive law of the land. No military or civil officer
can command an inferior to violate the laws of his country; nor will
such command excuse, much less justify, the act.... We do not mean
to go further than to say, that the participation of the inferior officer
in an act which he knows, or ought to know to be illegal, will not be
16
excused by the order of his superior.
Unlike the standard enunciated in Little v. Barrerneand United States
v. Bright, here the court enunciated what is, in effect, the recognized
standard today, i.e., that obedience to a superior order is not a defense
if the subordinate knows or ought to know it is illegal. Jones considered
not only the order in terms of its abstract legality, but the order in relation to the act it commanded as viewed by the subordinate. By focusing
attention on the state of mind of the actor and the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable belief in the legality of the orders would exculpate
the defendant by negating the requisite mens rea.17
Later, in Mitchell v. Harmony,8 another civil case, the Supreme
Court followed the rule enunciated in Little v. Barreme, that an order
to do an illegal act was an illegal order and would not excuse the subordinate's performing the act. However, the Court recognized that, depending on the circumstances, military necessity might purge the act
of its illegality.
As one might expect, the Civil War prompted consideration of the
problems involved with the superior-orders defense. At the outset of the
1526 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813).
161d. at 657-58.
1; Thc doctrine of Jones, was later reaffirmed in Despan v. Olney, 7 F. Cas. 534 (C.C.D.

R.I. 1852). The case involved an action for false arrest brought by a civilian against a
soldier who had arrested him pursuant to the orders of a superior. The court instructed
the jury:
I do not think the defendant was bound to go behind an order, thus apparently
lawful, and satisfy himself, by inquiry, that his commanding officer proceeded
upon sufficient grounds. To require this, would be destructive of military discipline, and of necessary promptness and efficiency of the service. Id. at 535.
18 13 How. 115 (1851).
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Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln approved the promulgation by
the War Department of "Instructions for the Government of the Armies
of the United States in the Field," by Francis Leiber, a professor of law
and political science at Columbia University. Leiber's "Instructions"
represent the first codification of international law relative to prisoners
of war ever issued by a government as a directive to its armed forces in
the field.19 Although the regulations did not deal expressly with the
question of superior orders, Dr. Leiber recognized the underlying principle:
Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease
on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to
God.

20

Several cases arose out of the Civil War that underscored Dr. Leiber's
statement of individual accountability. In one of the most articulate and

frequently cited cases of this period, the court found no error in a lower
court instruction that:
Any order given by an officer to a private, which does not expressly
and clearly show on its face or in the body thereof its own illegality,
the soldier would be bound to obey and such an order would be a
21
protection to him.

Another case of the same vintage worthy of consideration, both for
reasoning and result, is State v. Sparks,t2 an action for contempt of court
against Major Sparks, who, pursuant to orders, ignored a writ of habeas
19 This was published as General Order No. 100 of the Union Army on April 24, 1863,
and it is reproduced in JAGS Text 20-7, Law of Land Warfare (The Judge Advocate
General's School, U. S. Army, 1943), 155-86.
20T. TAYLOR, NupEMBRG AN VmwrNAm: AN AMERIcAN TRAGEDY 41 (1970).
2
1Riggs v. State, 3 Coldwell 85, 91 Am. Dec. 272, 273 (1866). The charge went on to
say:
But an order illegal in itself and not justified by the rules and usages of war, or
in its substance being clearly illegal so that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know as soon as he heard the order read or given that such order
was illegal, would afford a private no protection for a crime committed under
such order. Id. at 273.
The court in Riggs also held that a soldier who was ordered to join a detachment would
not be vicariously liable for a crime conmmitted by another member of the detachment,
as a co-couspirator or as an aider or abettor. Id. at 275.
22 27 Tex. 627 (1864).
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corpus and removed two individuals from the custody of the court. The
court stated that:
[T] here is nothing better settled, as well by the military as the civil
law, than that neither officers nor soldiers are bound to obey any illegal order of their superior officers; but on the contrary, it is their
bounden duty to disobey them. The soldier is still a citizen, and as
such is always amenable to the civil authority. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that the orders of Major General Magruder can furnish the
defendant, Major Sparks, no justification for his forcible interference
with the jurisdiction of this court, and settling at naught its lawful
28
order.
But the court also said that if Sparks were acting under orders, that fact
would go far to excuse him, and therefore Major General Magruder
would be the principal offender.
In McCall v. McDowell, 24 the defendant soldier was sued for false
imprisonment for having arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff as part
of an effort to quell an outbreak of riots in California following President Lincoln's assassination. The defendant pleaded in his defense that
he had acted pursuant to a general order from his commanding officer.
The court held for the defendant, saying:
Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it is
apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order
is illegal, I cannot but think that the laws should excuse the military
25
subordinate when acting in obedience to the orders of his commander.
The court would accept the superior order as a defense except where
the order is
23 Id. at 633. To get a sense of the confusion of the cases, compare Commonwealth v.
Holland, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 182 (1864) with Jones v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.) 34 (1866).

In Holland, the issue was whether the taking of a civilian's horses by the military, in
execution of a military order, was a crime. The court said that it was, noting that
"[a]rgument to prove this would be superfluous," and gave no citations. In Jones, the
defendant took slaves belonging to a civilian to another town, where they subsequently
became lost to the owner. The court found against the defendant, citing Mitchell for
the propositions that: 1) because an order to do an act forbidden by statute is an illegal
order, there is no defense of superior orders; and 2) property may be converted for the
military, but there must be an emergency. Commonwealth v. Holland was not cited.
24

15 F. Cas. 1235 (C.C.D. Calif. 1867).
at 1240.

25 Id.
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so palpably atrocious as well as illegal, that one must26instinctively feel
that it ought not to be obeyed, by whomever given.
The most famous case of the period was the trial of Major Henry
Wirz, the commandant of the Confederate prisoner-of-war camp at
Andersonville, Georgia, who was brought to trial for the inhumane conditions that existed at Andersonville. Wirz raised the defense of obedience to superior orders, claiming that he suffered the conditions at the
prisoner-of-war camp to exist pursuant to the orders of John H. Winder,
the officer in charge of Confederate prison camps. The court-martial
rejected Wirz's claim, found him guilty, and sentenced him to hang.27
By the turn of the century, the courts, with increasing frequency,
began using the standard of apparent illegality, first held out in United
States v. Jones, where actual knowledge of illegality was lacking, to
judge the legality of the order followed in determining whether the
order would exonerate the defendant. 28 In In re Fair, where a soldier
shot another soldier escaping from custody, the court said:
While I do not say that the order given by Sergeant Simpson to petitioners was in all particulars a lawful order, I do say that the illegality
of the order, if illegal it was, was not so much so as to be apparent and
palpable to the commonest understanding. If then, the petitioners acted
under such orders in good faith, without any criminal intent, but with
are not liable to
an honest purpose to perform a supposed duty, they
29
prosecution under the criminal laws of the state.
Id. at 1241.
G.C.M.O. 607 of 1865. Ex. Doc., No. 23, H.R. 40th Cong., 2d Sess. The Wirz trial
is discussed in depth in CmpMAx, TnE TRAGEDY OF ANDERSONVULLE, TaiUL oF CAPTAIN
HENRY Wxz, m PaisoN IKmER (1911).
28 This was not a unanimous view, however. In Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W.
484 (1911), the court said that although the general rule was that orders reasonably believed to be legal would be a defense,
we cannot consent that all military orders, however reasonable they may appear,
will afford protection in the civil or criminal courts of the state. Id. at 490-91.
29 100 F. 149, 155 (1900). In a case with almost identical facts as Fair, United States
v. Clark, 31 F. 710 (1887), the court said:
As there is no reason in this case to suppose that Clark was not doing what he
conceived to be his duty, and the act was not so cruelly illegal that a reasonable
man might not suppose it to be legal . . . and as there was an entire absence of
malice, I think he ought to be discharged. Id. at 717.
Another case of this period, Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa.
165 (1903), arose out of a United Mine Workers strike, which was accompanied by much
violence, and resulted in the calling out of the National Guard. Wadsworth, on sentry
26

27
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While by this time the law seemed well established in the civilian

courts that, although it was a soldier's duty to obey lawful orders, he
was under a duty not to obey orders he knew to be unlawful or that
were apparently unlawful, a dramatic change took place in military law
with respect to the individual soldier's responsibility for violations of
the law of war. In 1914 the Army published its successor to the Leiber
"Instructions," the Rules of Land Warfare, which expressly placed the
responsibility for violations of laws of war on those giving the illegal
orders, not on the subordinates who carried them out:
Individuals of the Armed Forces will not be punished for these offenses
in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their gov-

ernment or commanders. The commanders ordering the commission
of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their
troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may
fall.30

Thus, obedience to orders became an absolute defense.
This provision remained in effect throughout World War I, a war
in which there is an absence of any record of the prosecution of American military personnel for the unlawful execution or maltreatment of
prisoners of war or for any other violations of the law of war.3 ' One
duty with orders to shoot to kill, shot one Durham, who did not obey several commands to halt. The court quoted with approval from Hare, Constitutional Law:
A subordinate stands as regards the application of these principles, in a different
position from the superior whom he obeys, and may be absolved from liability
for executing an order which it was criminal to give. The question is, as we have
seen, had the accused reasonable cause for believing in the necessity of the act
which is impugned, and in determining this point, a soldier or member of a posse
comitatus may obviously take the orders of the person in command into view as
proceeding from one who is better able to judge and well-informed; and if the
circumstances are such that the command may be justifiable, he should not be
held guilty for declining to decide that it is wrong with the responsibility incident to disobedience, unless the case is so plain as not to admit of a reasonable
doubt.
30 Rules of Land Warfare, USA, Chapter X, Section 366 (1914). This change apparently resulted from a similar change in the BRITISH MILITARY MANUAL, which, in
1913, incorporated a similar provision. EDMONDS AND OPPENHEIM, BurISH LAND WARFARE, AN EXPOSITION OF THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR ON LAND FOR THE GiDANcE OF
OFFICERS OF His MAJEsTY's ARMIEs (1913). At the time this change was put into effect,

British case law paralleled American decisions on this subject. See, Ensign Maxwell,
2 BUCHANAN, REPORTS OF REMARKABLE TRIALS, 3, 58 (1813); Regina v. Smith, 17 Cape
Reports 561 (South Africa, 1900).
31 While a review of the court-martial orders at the National Archives fails to reveal
any prosecutions of American personnel for the killing or maltreatment of German
soldiers, Private Leo Renn was tried and acquitted for killing Edmond Poldus, a Belgian
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can only speculate whether this was the result of the provisions of the
1914 Rules of Land Warfare then in effect, or if in fact there were
simply no incidents that would have justified prosecution.
When World War II began, the law of superior orders in this country was in a state of confusion as a result of the conflict between the
1914 Rules of Land Warfare and the rule recognized in the civilian
courts. 2 The military rule was changed, however, on November 15,
1944, by a revision to the Rules of Land Warfare, by adding Section

345(1):
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and
customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that the
acts complained of were done pursuant to the order of a superior or
government sanction may be taken into consideration in determining
culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment.
The person giving such orders may also be punished.23
This change in the standard from recognizing obedience to orders as an
absolute defense to letting it be considered a factor in determining instevedore who failed to stop when Renn, while on guard duty in France, ordered Poldus
to halt. The basis for the acquittal was that he had acted in "obedience to lawful orders."
G.C.M.O. No. 2, August 17, 1917; Court-Martial Record No. 105620.
32-The applicable rule as enunciated in the 1914 Rules of Land Warfare was republished in the 1940 edition and remained unchanged. BAsic FIEU) MANUAL (FM27-10)
§ 347 (1940). It is uncertain how many prosecutions of American soldiers for unauthorized killing of aliens arose out of World War IA but there were at least two courtsmartial for the killing of enemy prisoners by American GI's, who claimed they were
acting pursuant to the orders of General George S. Patton, Jr, in the "Massacre of
Scoglitti" during the invasion of Sicily in 1943, discussed more fully at p. 498, infra.
33 Change 1, 15 November 1944, to the Rules of Land Warfare, 345.1. As in 1914,
the British took the lead in this change and amended their Field Manual in April 1944
to provide:
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order of the
belligerent government or of an individual belligerent commander does not deprive the act in question of its character as a war crime; neither does it in principle confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured
belligerent. Undoubtedly, a court confronted with the plea of superior orders
adduced in justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the
fact that obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of
every member of the armed forces and that the latter cannot in conditions of
war discipline, be expected to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order
received. The question, however, is governed by the major principle that members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts
which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity. Amendment No. 34, Brtish Field Manual. 1 WAR CRIMES
TaJALS, Appendix I, at 150 (1948).
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dividual responsibility was the first step in a return to the standard that
had existed in the military prior to the adoption of the 1914 Rules of
Land Warfare. The conclusion seems inescapable that this change was
brought about, at least in part, by the Allied attitude toward the Nazi
atrocities and the anticipated prosecutions for those violations of the
laws of war.
At Nuremberg, the world's attention focused on the issue of the defense of superior orders in a way that was unprecedented in history; and
Nuremberg produced the most stringent standard to which American
jurisprudence has ascribed since Little v. Barreme. While the 1944 Rules
of Land Warfare provision permitted the fact of obedience to superior
orders to be considered as a defense, the War Crimes Tribunal specifically rejected obedience to superior orders as a defense, and made a subordinate absolutely liable for his actions. The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal provided in Section II, Article 8:
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his government
or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
34
justice so requires.
In light of the sheer magnitude of the atrocities reviewed at Nuremberg, it is not surprising that the Tribunal made an attempt to cut
through the abstract legalisms surrounding all the defenses raised and
focus on what was really at issue: under what circumstances should
those who participated in the Nazi atrocities be relieved of responsibility
for their actions? The Tribunal stated:
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of
most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
choice was in fact possible.3 5
34Charter of the International Tribunal, I Trials of War Criminals at XII. The provision for the military tribunals trying the Japanese war criminals was essentially the
same.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 26, 1946:
Section II, Article 6. Responsibility of the Accused. Neither the official position,
at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order
of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. Reprinted at R. MiNAR, VIcToR's Jusrca, THE
ToKYo WAR CiuaEs TRIuAL 187 (1971).

35 United States v. Ohlendorf (the Eisensatzgrupen Case) 4 N.M.!. 470.

1973]

THE DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

This test of "moral choice" led to the requirement of duress as a necessary part of the defense of superior orders.8 6 However, it was clearly
pointed out that if duress was pleaded, the accused must establish that
he had a reasonable fear of immediate death or serious bodily harm. It
was not enough for the accused to claim that the coercion inherent in an
order, and in the superior-subordinate relationship, even in the military,
left him without a moral choice:
Superior means superior in capacity and power to force a certain act.
It does not mean superiority only in rank.... The test to be used is
whether the subordinate acted under coercion 8or7 whether he himself
approved of the principle involved in the order.
Clearly, the Nuremberg standard of obedience to superior orders is
a much stricter standard than any applied by American courts since
United States v. Jones allowed an apparently legal, though actually illegal, order to be a defense. The original American position on the defense of obedience to orders before the adoption of the Charter and
Article 8 was much closer to the traditional American view. In his report
to the President just prior to the Nuremberg Trials, Justice Robert H.
Jackson wrote:
There is doubtless a sphere in which the defense of obedience to superior orders should prevail. If a conscripted or enlisted soldier is put
on a firing squad, he should not be held responsible for the validity
of the sentence he carries out

...

An accused should be allowed to

36

Let it be said at once that there is no law which requires that an innocent man
must forfeit his life or suffer serious bodily harm in order to avoid committing a
crime which he condemns. ld. at 480.
The plea of duress, while seemingly a natural companion to the plea of obedience to
superior orders, has not been raised often in the obedience to superior orders cases. Although there is undoubtedly some coercion inherent in the mere giving of an order
by a superior to a subordinate, it is necessary, to make out a defense of duress, that
there be sufficient coercion to put the actor in a reasonable apprehension of immediate
death or serious bodily harm. E.g., United States v. Fleming, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R.
7 (1957), United States v. Olson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 22 C.M.R. 250 (1957). Since an
officer cannot summarily execute a subordinate for failure to obey an order, the mere
fact of an order, without more, would not seem to meet the duress standard. Although
a fact situation could certainly arise where the subordinate is put in a reasonable fear
of immediate death, such as where an order is given at gunpoint, the defense of duress
would be made out without reference to the giving of an order. Therefore, although
the two defenses may theoretically overlap, in reality duress must be seen as a separate
defense which requires its own special fact situation.
3
7 United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 N.MJ. at 480.
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show the facts about superior orders. The tribunal can then determine
whether they constitute a defense or merely extenuating circumstances,
or perhaps carry no import at all.38
The principle of a defense to superior orders was included in the
American drafts of Article 8 as a "defense per se" and not merely as a
factor that would mitigate punishment. However, the Soviet Union opposed the use of the defense of obedience to orders even inmitigation,
and the United States withdrew its proposal for the "per se defense"
under Soviet pressure.3"
Thus, the international law rule, as expressed by the Nuremberg
standard, was quite different from and much stricter than the existing
American rule.40
Following World War II, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which became effective on May 31, 1951. 41 While none
of its provisions deal with the defense of superior orders as such, the
Manual for Courts-Martial,United States, 1951, which contains the rules
of procedure and evidence in court-martial proceedings, contained a
specific provision relating to the defense of orders, providing that:
[T]he acts of a subordinate done in good faith compliance with his
supposed duties or orders are justifiable. This justification does not
exist, however, when those acts are manifestly beyond the scope of
authority, or the order is such that a man of ordinary sense and under42
standing would know it to be illegal.
38 Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President, released by the White House on
June 7, 1945, Department of State, Trials of War Criminals, Publication 2420 (1945)
at 3-4.
89 Y. DiNsTmN supra note 10, at 116-17. Dinstein calls this withdrawal "remarkable."
40 Universal application of the Nuremberg rule of absolute liability would totally
ignore the interest that a state has in maintaining a military that can expect immediate
obedience of at least apparently legal orders, which is essential to the efficient functioning of the military. The present American rule of manifest illegality, bottomed in the
principle of lack of mens rea, accommodates both society's interest in controlling individual action and the interest of having an effective military, and seems to be a more
reasonable, though less strict, standard.
41 Act of May 5, 1951, Pub. L. No. 81-506, Ch. 169 § 1, 64 Stat. 108 (codified at 50
U.S.C.) §§ 551-736. It should be noted at this point that through this enactment
Congress established the military judicial system providing for an intermediate tribunal
for each service, designated Boards of Review, and the United States Court of
Military Appeals. Decisions of these tribunals have since been published in the CourtMartial Reports.
197b. Substantially similar provisions appeared in the MCM,
42 MCM, USA, 1951
USA, 1928 148a and MCM, USA, 1949, 179a. When the Manual for Courts-Martial
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The Korean War, which closely followed the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, once again gave rise to consideration of
the defense of superior orders in the case of United States v. Kinder,3
probably the leading reported military case on the issue of superior
orders. Airman Thomas F. Kinder, while on sentry duty at an ammunition dump 300 miles south of the battle line, captured a Korean intruder.
Kinder transferred custody of the Korean to Corporal Robert C. Toth,
who, while taking the Korean to the guard house, pistol-whipped him,
rendering him unconscious. Upon their arrival at the guard house, the
matter was reported to Lieutenant George C. Schreiber, the officer in
charge. Kinder came in shortly after Toth, and Lieutenant Schreiber
ordered him to take the Korean out and shoot him. Kinder carried out
the order while Toth waited in a jeep. Kinder was tried and convicted
of premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. On appeal his
counsel raised in oral argument the contention that obedience to a superior order was a defense, regardless of the legality of the order. In an
opinion containing a thorough consideration of the civilian authority,
the Air Force Board of Review rejected Kinder's contentions, holding
that obedience to superior orders is no excuse when a man of common
understanding would know an order to be unlawful, and saying further:
[O]f controlling significance in the instant case is the manifest and
unmistakable illegality of the order.44
was revised in 1969, the subject was covered under the general category of "Special
Defenses" and provided:
Obedience to apparently 'lawful' orders. An order requiring the performance of a
military duty may be inferred to be legal. An act performed manifestly beyond
the scope of authority, or pursuant to an order that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be illegal, or in a wanton manner in the discharge
of a lawful duty, is not excusable. MCM, 1969 (Rev.)
216d.
43 A.C.M. 7321, 14 C.M.R. 742 (1953).
44 Id. at -,
14 C.M.R. at 774. For his part in ordering the shooting, Lieutenant George
C. Schreiber was convicted of premeditated murder by general court-martial. United
States v. Schreiber, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 602, 18 C.M.R. 226 (1955). The other participant,
Robert W. Toth, was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of Articles 118 and 81 of the UNIwoRm CODE OF MmrruRy JtsrTcE, 64 Star. 140, 134,
50 U.S.C. §§ 712 and 675, after he was honorably discharged from the Air Force, Toth
was arrested and returned to Korea to stand trial. The Air Force asserted court-martial
jurisdiction under Article 3(a), UNIwoRm CODE OF MIIARY JusTCE, 64 Stat. 109,. 50,
U.S.C. § 553, which provided:
Subject to the provisions of Article 43, any person charged with having committed,
while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code,
punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot
be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or
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Kinder brought into the stream of reported military authority both
the reasoning and language from the early development of the rule in
civilian courts, quoting quite liberally and with approval from State v.
Riggs and Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall.
Following the Korean War, the law governing superior orders as a
defense to violations of the law of war was further clarified in 1956,
when the Army published Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956, which provided:
a. The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an
order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor does it
constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual unless he did
not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that
the act ordered was unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not
to constitute a defense to an allegation of war crime, the fact that the
individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment.
b. In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes
a valid defense, the court shall take into consideration the fact that
obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every member of the
armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in conditions of war
discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the orders received;
that certain rules of warfare may be controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may be done in obedience to orders
conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same time, it must be borne
armed forces are bound to obey only
in mind that members of the
45
lawful orders. Paragraph 509.
of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by
courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status.
Toth's sister brought habeas corpus proceedings in the District of Columbia, Toth v.
Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.CD.C. 1953). The case was ultimately
decided by the Supreme Court, which held in one of the leading decisions on the scope
of military jurisdiction that Article 3(a) of the UmFoRM CoDE op MILITARY JusTIcE was
unconstitutional. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). The military courts thus being
deprived of jurisdiction, Toth was released and never stood trial for the offenses,
because the federal courts were also without jurisdiction.
45There is an apparent difference of opinion among the commentators as to the import of the 1956 revision. Wilner, Superior Orders as a Defense to Violation of International Criminal Law, 26 MD. L. REv. 127, 141-42, is of the opinion that it reflects a

softer position than that enunciated in 1944, by leaving "open the loophole of evading
punishment for acts represented by superior officers as reprisals." He further charac-
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Since Kinder was decided, reported military cases dealing with the
superior-orders defense have arisen out of the Vietnam War. Vietnam
has, based on available records, produced more prosecutions of American
military personnel for killing foreign nationals than any previous conflict, and consequently has produced more cases in which the issue could
be raised. 46
The reported Vietnam decisions have reaffinned the principle that
obedience to orders that are manifestly illegal is not a defense. In United
States v. Keenan,47 the Court of Military Appeals approved an instruction that stated that the justification for acts done in compliance with
an order did not exist if
terizes the provision as an equivocal statement which can serve as authority for the
commission of almost every type of atrocity against the military forces of a belligerent
nation, as well as, in many cases, against civilians. On the other hand, T. TAYLoR,
NREAMERG AND VwmNAm: AN Aimmct T Acny, is of the opinion that the principles
contained in the 1956 provision are sound and must be assessed in all cases involving
the defense of superior orders, regardless of the circumstances.
40
NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONS TRIED AND CONVICTED
OF MURDER OR LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALS
Lesser
Included
Tried
Convicted
Acquitted
Offenses
1965
0
1966
7
4
1
2-Manslaughter
1967
16
10
3
2-Manslaughter
1-Negligent homicide
1968
15
3
3
4-Manslaughter
3-Negligent homicide
1-Assault
1-Willfully discharging
firearm so as to endanger life
1969
18
11
6
1-Willfully discharging
firearm so as to endanger life
1970
22
7
10
5-(not enumerated)
1971*
25
4
15
3-Manslaughter
2-Negligent homicide
1-Aggravated assault
Information obtained from the Office of the Clerk, United States Army Judiciary
Includes through October 31, 1972.
47 18 U.S.C.M.A. 108, 39 C.M.R. 108 (1969).
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the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and under48
standing would know it to be illegal.
In United States v. Griffin,49 an Army Board of Review, in approving a
finding of manifest illegality as a matter of law used this language:
[W] e view the order as commanding an act so obviously beyond the
scope of authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on its
face as to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of ordinary
sense and understanding."
And in United States v. Schultz,51 the Court of Military Appeals, in approving the denial of any instruction on the obedience to orders defense,
said the order in that case
would have been palpably unlawful. See United States v. Kinder, 14
52
CMR 742, and the abundant authority contained in that case.
Thus, the standard of the defense of obedience to superior orders in
American military jurisprudence has been settled for the last twenty
years and can be traced in civilian law to the time of the Federalists in
Jones, and not to the Nuremberg Trials.
Applying the Standard
Despite the myriad factual situations in which superior orders have
been raised as a defense, and the apparent simplicity and clarity of the
rule, it has posed difficult problems in application since Chief Justice
John Marshall struggled with the issue in Little v. Barreme. A number
of writers have analyzed the standard as it exists in international law.
Dr. Yoram Dinstein, author of The Defense of 'Obedience to Superior Orders' in International Law, the leading work on the subject,
48 Id. at -,
39 C.M.R. at 117, n.3 (1969). The order that Keenan was given was to
shoot an elderly Vietnamese. It is interesting to note that the man giving Keenan the
order, Corporal Luczko, for his part in the slaying, was acquitted by reason of insanity.
49 C.M. 416805, 39 C.M.R. 586 (1969).
501d. at 590. Sergeant Griffen had been ordered to shoot a Vietnamese who was bound
with his hands behind his back.
5118 U.S.C.M.A. 133, 39 C.M.R. 133 (1969).
52d. at 136. Corporal Schultz entered the house of a Vietnamese family, took the male
of the house outside, and shot him. Schultz was at that time on a patrol to ambush
Vietcong, but his assignment did not contemplate any action such as he took.
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after an exhaustive analysis of the literature in the area, concludes that
the proper rule should be:
[T]he fact of obedience to orders constitutes not a defense per se but
only a factual element that may be taken into account in conjunction
with the other circumstances of the given case within the compass of a
defence based on lack of mens rea, that is, mistake of law or fact of
compulsion. Only lack of mens rea, of which obedience to orders constitutes circumstantial evidence, serves to protect from criminal responsibility in this case.5 3
Under Dinstein's rule, the manifest illegality of the order is an objective
criterion that should be treated as a rule of evidence. This rule of evidence would facilitate the task of proving the subordinate's knowledge
of the illegality of the order by creating a presumption of actual knowledge where proof of knowledge is lacking.54
Telford Taylor, author of Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American
Tragedy, notes that the "lack of knowledge of an order's unlawfulness
is a defense, and fear of punishment for disobedience a mitigating circumstance." Thus, Taylor's view is similar to Dinstein's in that he also
recognizes that the crux of the defense is lack of mens rea, but Taylor
does not see obedience to orders merely as an 'element showing lack of
mens rea, but under certain circumstances, as a complete affirmative defense. This view is embodied in the Army's current standard as set forth
in Par. 509, FM27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, and in Par. 197 of the
Manual of Courts Martial.5 Regardless of whether one views obedience
to orders as an independent defense or as an evidentiary fact, there are
practical problems that face the court and counsel in applying the
standard in a given case. Taylor accurately observes that:
[T]he language [of Par. 509, FM27-10] is well chosen to convey the
quality of the factors, imponderable as they are, that must be assessed
in a given case. As with so many good rules, the difficulty lies in its
application-in weighing evidence that is likely to be ambiguous or
conflicting. Was there a superior order? Especially at the lower levels,
many orders are given orally. Was a particular remark or look intended
as an order, and if so what was its scope? If the existence and meaning
53 Y. DrNsmiw, DR. Yo.am, THE DEFENsE OF 'OBEDiENcE To SUPERIOR ORDERS' rN
INTrNA
NAL LAW 88.
54 Id. at 29.

55 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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of the order are reasonably clear, there may still be much doubt about
the attendant circumstances-how far the obeying soldier was aware
of them, and how well equipped to judge them. If the order was plainly illegal, to what degree of duress was the subordinate subjected?
Especially in confused ground fighting of the type prevalent in Vietnam, evidentiary questions such as these may be extremely difficult to
56
resolve.
While it may be belaboring the obvious, the threshold question in
establishing the obedience to superior orders defense is determining
whether there was an order from a superior to the defendant. 57. The
defendant facing trial who intends to rely on an order from a superior
in justification for his act has the burden of going forward with evidence
of the order, because the plea is an affirmative defense-essentially, one
of confession and avoidance. And once the prosecution has presented a
prima facie case of the crime charged, the defendant has the burden of
going forward with the evidence of his affirmative defenses.5 8
The existence of the order in the first instance is obviously a question
of fact and may be proved by any competent evidence, i.e., necessarily,
the testimony of the defendant plus any corroborating evidence he might
present. Suffice it to say that the order relied upon could be either written or oral, but, depending upon the circumstances of the case, it may
raise serious problems of proof, and require the resolution of conflicting
testimony and the interpretation of ambiguous language. One of the
more interesting examples of this problem arose during the Second
World War, and involved the disputed interpretation of statements
made by General George S. Patton on June 27, 1943, in a speech to the
officers and men of the 45th Infantry Division just prior to their embarkation for the invasion of Sicily in Operation Husky. The controversy arose over Patton's prepared remarks, which included these statements:
56 T. TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 51-52. For the purpose of this discussion, I will treat
obedience to orders as an affirmative defense, which is the present military rule, and not
under Dinstein's "mens reea principle." In addition, while under the military judicial
system trials by courts-martial are presided over by a "military judge," and the equivalent of the civilian jury are "the members of the court-martial," I shall refer to them by

the equivalent civilian terms of "judge" and "jury."
57 In some cases there may be insufficient evidence of the existence of the order to
require an instruction on the defense of obedience to orders. See United States v.
Schultz, supra note 52.
5

s See A.C.M. 7321, Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742.

19731

THE DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

The fact we are operating in enemy country does not permit us to
forget our American tradition of respect for private property, noncombatants, and women.
Attack rapidly, ruthlessly, viciously and without rest, and kill even
civilians who have the stupidity to fight us.59
Several days after the operation began, during which time the fighting
was extremely fierce, a Captain Compton, who had lost several of his
men, lined up forty-three captured Germans, some of whom were wearing civilian clothes, and had them executed by machine gun. At about
the same time and in the same general location, a Sergeant West (of
another company) shot and killed thirty-six Germans whom he was
escorting to the prisoner-of-war cage in the rear.
When General Patton learned of these incidents, he ordered both
men court-martialed on charges of pre-meditated murder. At their trials,
the two men asserted as a defense the orders issued by General Patton
on June 27, 1943 in his preparatory speech. According to the defense,
Patton had instructed the men that:
If the enemy resisted until we got to within 200 yards, he had forfeited
his right to live.
As for ambushes, General Patton was alleged to have said:
When you are sniped at, especially from the rear, the snipers must be
destroyed.
The defense's assertions prompted a subsequent inquiry into the speech
given by Patton, in which he was ultimately exonerated after producing
the prepared text of the speech and delivering it orally to a board of
investigating officers. Captain Compton and Sergeant West, however,
were convicted as charged.
Similar problems of interpretation of general pre-operation addresses
were involved in the Calley trial. In addition to the testimony of Lieutenant Calley and Captain Ernest Medina, approximately seventy-five witnesses testified concerning not only the orders given by Captain Medina
59

provided the information
rH,
Ladislas Farago, author of PATroN: ORDFaLALn Tmuzv
concerning these trials, which were not recorded in any of the combat narratives of
World War II. Letter from Ladislas Farago to the author, April 8, 1971.
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to the Company on March 15, 1968, but also to the entire development
of the plans including the briefings given at the Brigade level and by
the other company commanders who were involved in the same operation but not in the assault on My Lai 4.
Assuming that the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable inference of the existence of an order, the next quesdon to be decided is whether the order relied upon by the defendant was
lawful in the abstract, which must be determined by the judge purely
as a matter of law, and is not within the province of the jury.O If the
judge determines that the order relied upon was lawful, and the defendant's conduct did not exceed the scope of his authority under the
order, then necessarily there would be a directed verdict in his behalf
because his actions would not have constituted a crime. If, however, the
order was unlawful, the next questions to be resolved are whether the
defendant had actual knowledge of its illegality, or whether the superior's order was manifestly illegal, i.e., one which a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be
unlawful. Proof of the subordinate's actual knowledge of the illegality
of the order is difficult to establish, and absent a judicial admission or a
lawfully obtained confession, it would be a question of fact for the jury
to decide. While it is unlikely that a defendant would attempt to plead
superior orders as a defense while at the same time admitting knowledge
of the order's illegality, in such a case the judge should decide as a matter
of law that obedience to the order is not a defense.6 '
The most difficult problem, of course, is the question of the manifest
illegality of the order, i.e., its apparent illegality to a reasonable man
under the circumstances. In the usual case, direct evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge of the illegality of the order would not be
present, and it becomes necessary to examine the "manifest illegality" of
the order. Although the present military standard recognizes superior
orders as an independent affirmative defense and has not expressly
adopted Dinstein's "mens rea principle," Dinstein's analysis of the manifest illegality principle as a rule of evidence and aid in proof to establish
knowledge of illegality is helpful in understanding the rule. However,
the question that apparently has not been thoroughly analyzed, and one
60

E.g., United States v. Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R. 379 (1965).
61 See CM 417153, Figueroa, 39 C.M.R. 494 (1968), where the Board of Review re-

jected the accused's defense of superior orders to a larceny charge when the accused
admitted knowing that his order to steal was an unlawful one.
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on which judges appear to be divided is when, if ever, after having determined that an order is unlawful, should the judge decide it is "manifestly illegal" as a matter of law.
Wilner alluded to this question when he observed that the problem
with the standard in international criminal law is
the failure to create a solid and unimpeachable basis for rejecting the
defense as a matter of law-and not for reasons of political or emotional
62
expedience ....
The problem is illustrated by the difference in the approaches used
by the judges in the Griffen and Calley cases, both of which involved
prosecutions of premeditated murder for the summary executions of unarmed and unresisting captives, and conflicting evidence of the orders.
In Griffen, the judge instructed the jury that if the defendant received
an order to kill the helpless Vietnamese prisoner, such an order would
have been "manifestly illegal" as a matter of law. On appeal, the Army
Board of Review sustained the judge's instruction, holding that an instruction is not required unless there is some evidence that will allow a
reasonable inference that a defense is in issue. Under the facts of the
case, they found
no evidence which could provide an inference suggestive of self-defense, or that the killing was to prevent the escape of the prisoner, or
for that matter, any other justification or excuse for the killing.68
The Board added:
As there was no evidence which would have allowed a reasonable
inference that the accused justifiably killed the prisoner pursuant to the
order of a superior officer, it follows, as a matter of law, that this defense was not in issue, the law officer did not err by refusing to give
an instruction on it, and that the law officer properly instructed the
court that such an order would have been manifestly illegal.6 4
In Calley, however, the judge, while instructing the jury that an order
to ldll unresisting Vietnamese within his control would be illegal as a
matter of law, left for the jury to decide the 'question of "manifest il62

Wilner, Superior Orders as a Defense to Violations of International Criminal Law,

26 AM. L. REv. 127 (1966).

o 3 Supra note 50, at 590.
641d.
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legality" by having them determine whether a man of ordinary sense
and understanding would know the order to be illegal.6 5
While convictions resulted in both the Calley and Griffen cases and
the defense was rejected despite the differences in the instructions, this
nevertheless could make a significant difference in the outcome of a
given case.
Although it is always difficult to analyze and fathom the reasons for
a jury's verdict without actually questioning them, in another case arising out of the My Lai Massacre, where the judge left it to the jury to
decide the question of manifest illegality, an acquittal did result where
the evidence seemingly dictated a conviction. The case involved the
prosecution of Sergeant Charles Hutto, a machine gunner, for assault
with intent to commit murder. At the trial the prosecution introduced
a statement made by Hutto that he had shot at a group of My Lai
villagers who had been taken captive and had killed perhaps eight to ten
of them. Hutto described this as "murder" in the statement, but testified
at his trial that he was following Captain Medina's orders, which he believed to be lawful. If one views the evidence in a light most favorable
to the accused, the evidence of Hutto's actual knowledge of the illegality
of the order was conflicting; nevertheless, had the judge instructed the
jury that such an order would have been "manifestly illegal" and therefore no defense, the result might well have been different.
The question of "manifest illegality" should be decided as a "matter
of law" in those extreme cases involving the summary execution of an
unarmed and unresisting prisoner, because the United States is committed
to the protection of prisoners both morally and legally through longstanding treaty obligations. 6 Indeed, under her present treaty obligations, the United States is required to disseminate in time of peace and
war this portion of the text of the conventions, affording protection
as widely as possible ....and in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and if possible, civil instruction, so
65

See the instructions to the court-martial in the Calley case included in the Appendix.
788-96 (2d ed. 1921); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of 12 August 1949, T.IA.S. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea of 12 August 1949, T.IA.S. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365. These
treaties were ratified by the United States on February 2, 1956.
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that the principles may become known to all [its] armed forces and
67
to the entire population.
Moreover, the United States has an obligation "to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed" the willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment of persons taken captive and
68
to bring them to trial.
While it may be argued, and not without some basis, that in light of
the public's reaction to the Calley verdict the United States has failed
to fully implement its treaty obligation to educate the public and the
members of the Armed Forces, it would also seem, in light of the public's
awareness and concern for the treatment of our own prisoners of war
by the North Vietnamese, that there should not be any question about
any American citizen or soldier knowing that it is morally wrong to
summarily execute helpless captives. Consequently, at this point in our
history, it would seem that a judge should unquestionably and without
hesitation determine the "manifest illegality" of such orders as a matter
of law, and not permit them to be used as a defense, but only as a matter
in mitigation.
Conclusion
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson observed prior to his appointment as
Prosecutor for the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that
the chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of
the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility
to the political judgments of their contemporaries and the moral judg69
ments of history.
6T Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, Article 47, T.I.A.S. 3362; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, Article 48, T.I.A.S. 3363;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
Article 127, T.IA.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Article 144, T.I.A.S. 3365.
68 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, Article 49, T.IA.S. 3362; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, Article 50, T.IA.S. 3363,
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949,
Article 127, T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Article 146, T.IA.S. 3365.
60 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
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If one views the rejection of obedience to orders as a defense to the
summary execution and inhumane treatment of persons taken captive by
our forces as a restraint on our physical forces, which clearly one must,
then in light of the public reaction to the Calley trial, one must wonder
how quickly the military will emphasize the importance of compliance
with this moral and legal commitment. For the sake of our own prisoners
now and in possible future wars, which hopefully will not occur, one
would hope that the Calley verdict will serve a useful purpose in educating the citizenry of this country, and will act as a deterrent to future
My Lai's. But if similar cases should occur in the future involving our
own troops, hopefully obedience to superior orders will be rejected as
a defense as a matter of law, and once again emphasize that a soldier is
not an automaton but a reasoning agent who is under a duty to make
appropriate moral judgments.
APPENDIX
We next come to the area of acts done in accordance with the order
of a superior. If, under my previous instructions, you find that people
died at My Lai (4) on 16 March 1968, as charged-which would include
a finding that Lt. Calley caused their deaths-you must then consider
whether Lt. Calley's actions causing death were done pursuant to orders
received by him. There is considerable evidence in the record on this
point.
Captain Medina, you will recall, testified that he told his assembled
officers and men the C Company had been selected to conduct a combat
assault on My Lai (4), which intelligence indicated was the current
location of the 48th VC Battalion; that they would probably be outnumbered two to one; that they could expect heavy resistance; that they
would finally get an opportunity to engage and destroy the battalion
which they had been chasing unsuccessfully, and which was responsible
for all the mines, booby-traps and sniper fire they had received. He
recalled telling his personnel that "innocent civilians or non-combatants"
would be out of the village at market by the time of the assault; and that
they had permission to, and were ordered to destroy the village of My
Lai (4) by burning the houtches, killing the livestock, destroying the
food crops, and closing the wells. He testified that he recalled being
asked whether women and children could be killed, and that in response
to that question he instructed his troops to use common sense, and that
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engagement of women and children was permissible if women or children engaged or tried to harm the American troops. He denied saying
that everything in the village was to be killed.
Lt. Calley testified that he attended the company briefing and that
Captain Medina instructed the company to unite, fight together, and
become extremely aggressive; that the people in the area in which they
had been operating were the enemy and had to be treated like enemy;
that My Lai (4) was to be neutralized completely; that the area had
been prepped by "psy war" methods; that all civilians had left the area
and that anyone found there would be considered to be enemy; that
everything in the village was to be destroyed during a high speed combat assault; and that no one was to be allowed to get in behind the
advancing troops. Subsequent villages, through which they would be
maneuvering enroute to the primary assault on the 48th VC Battalion at
Pirkville or My Lai (1), were to be treated in the same manner. He
testified that at a platoon leaders' briefing after the company briefing,
Captain Medina reemphasized that under no circumstances would they
allow anyone to get behind them, and that nothing was to be left standing in these villages. Lt. Calley also testified that while he was in the village of My Lai (4), on the eastern side, he twice received orders from
Captain Medina: first to "hurry and get rid of the people and get into
position that [he] was supposed to be in;" and thereafter, to stop searching the bunkers, to "waste the people," and to move his troops out onto
the defensive perimeter as Captain Medina had ordered. Captain Medina denied giving any such orders.
A number of other witnesses have also testified about the terms used
by Captain Medina in issuing the assault order to his platoon leaders and
troops on 15 March; about their actions done in response to these
orders; about radio transmissions remembered-and not rememberedoccurring during the operation; and about other matters that may have
a bearing on what orders, if any, were issued Lt. Calley. I have not
summarized all this evidence, but you should consider it all. As I have
previously stated, it is your recollection of the evidence, not mine,
that governs. On the basis of all the evidence you have heard, you
should determine what order, if any, Lt. Calley acted under when he
caused the deaths of any or all of the alleged victims, if he did cause
their deaths. As I previously stated, you do not reach the question of
orders unless you have found one or more of the charged victims dead
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-or in the case of specification 2 of the Additional Charge, have found
the charged victim to be dead or to have been assaulted-and, under my
previous instructions, have found the deaths to have been caused or assault
to have been committed in that one case, by Lt. Calley. As I also previously instructed you, for the death of an individual to be termed
murder or manslaughter under our law, the killing must have been done
without justification or excuse. To convict Lt. Calley, you must also
reach that conclusion. Thus you must consider the legality or illegality
of any acts done by Lt. Calley resulting in the death of charged victims,
and the legality or illegality of any order which you find him to have
been acting pursuant to and in accordance with, during your deliberations on guilt or innocence. I will again give you the law. You must
apply it to the facts.
The conduct of warfare is not wholly unregulated by law. Nations
have agreed to treaties limiting warfare; and customary practices governing warfare have, over a period of time, become recognized by law
as binding on the conduct of warfare. Some of these deal with the
propriety of killing during war. The killing of resisting or fleeing
enemy forces is generally recognized as a justifiable act of war, and
you may consider any such killing justifiable in this case. The law
attempts to protect those persons not actually engaging in warfare,
however; and limits the circumstances under which their lives may be
taken.
Both combatants captured by and noncombatants detained by the
opposing force, regardless of their loyalties, political views or prior
acts, have the right to be treated as prisoners until released, confined, or
executed, in accordance with law and established procedures, by competent authority sitting in judgment of such detained or captured individuals. Summary execution of detainees or prisoners is forbidden by
law. Further, it is clear under the evidence presented in this case, that
hostile acts or support of the enemy North Vietnamese or Viet Cong
forces by inhabitants of My Lai (4) at some time prior to 16 March
1968, would not justify the summary execution of all or a part of the
occupants of My Lai (4) on 16 March, nor would hostile acts committed that day, if, following the hostility, the belligerents surrendered
or were captured by our forces. I therefore instruct you, as a matter
of law, that if unresisting human beings were killed at My Lai (4) while
within the effective custody and control of our military forces, their
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deaths cannot be considered justified, and any order to kill such people
would be, as a matter of law, an illegal order. Thus if you find that
Lt. Calley reecived an order directing him to kill unresisting Vietnamese
within his control or within the control of his troops, that order would
be an illegal order.
The question does not rest there, however. A determination that an
order is illegal does not, of itself, assign criminal responsibility to the
person following the order for acts done in compliance with it. Soldiers
are taught to follow orders, and special attention is given to obedience
of orders on the battlefield. Military effectiveness depends upon obedience to orders. On the other hand, the obedience of a soldier is not
the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, obliged
to respond, not as a machine, but as a person. The law takes these factors into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts done in
,compliance with illegal orders.
The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order
given him by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability
upon him unless the superior's order is one which a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be
unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the accused
to be unlawful.
To reach this issue of "superior orders" during your deliberations,
you must first have concluded, as I have outlined above, that one or
more of the charged victims died, or that the alleged victim in Specification 2 of the Additional Charge was assaulted, as a result of the
accused's actions. You must next determine whether the actions which
you have found Lt. Calley to have committed, if any, were done in
accordance with and pursuant to the orders which he testifies that he
received from Captain Medina.
The record contains substantial evidence bearing on the question of
the order given. You have heard the testimony of Lt. Calley, Captain
Medina, and others as to the orders that Lt. Calley was given. I have
recounted part of this previously. There is also circumstantial evidence
that you may find relevant. For example a number of witnesses have
testified that there were bodies scattered throughout the village, from
west to east. Other witnesses testified that when they discovered that
there was light or no resistance, they ceased firing and began to gather
and move the occupants of the village as on previous search and clear
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operations. There is evidence that this was labeled a search and destroy
operation. There is evidence also that artillery was to be placed close
to or on the villege. Other witnesses have testified about the actions of
the gunships, and of the members of all three platoons and the headquarters element. Various radio-telephone conversations on the day
of the assault have been recounted, and you have heard testimony from
all of Captain Medina's RTO's and from Mr. Sledge, who was one of
Lt. Calley's RTO's. Lt. Calley's other RTO, whom Lt. Calley has testified was carrying the company-push radio, was later killed in combat.
You have also heard Lt. Calley's testimony that Captain Medina's two
radio calls, on which he testified he acted, were transmitted to him
while he was on the eastern side of the village, and that he was never
south of the village at the area that has been referred to here as the intersection of the North-South and East-West trails.
As I have mentioned a number of times, I am only calling your attendon to some of the evidence to give you an indication of the variety
of matters you might consider in resolving these questions. The evidence, as we are all aware, is voluminous; and you must decide what
portions of it are relevant and credible to determine the issues presented
to you. In determining what order, if any, Lt. Calley acted under, if
you find him to have acted, you should consider all the matters which
he has testified reached him and which you can infer from other evidence that he saw and heard. Then, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting under orders directing him in substance and effect to kill unresisting occupants of My Lai (4), you must
determine whether Lt. Calley actually knew those orders to be unlawful.
Knowledge on the part of any accused, like any other fact in issue,
may be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by evidence of facts
from which it may justifiably be inferred that Lt. Calley had knowledge
of the unlawfulness of the order which he has testified he followed. In
determining whether or not Lt. Calley had knowledge of the unlawfulness of any order found by you to have been given, you may consider
all relevant facts and circumstances, including Lt. Calley's rank; educational background; OCS schooling; other training while in the Army,
including Basic Training, and his training in Hawaii and Vietnam; his
experience on prior operations involving contact with hostile and
friendly Vietnamese; his age; and any other evidence tending to prove
or disprove that on 16 March 1968, Lt. Calley knew the order was
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unlawful. If you find beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of all the
evidence, that Lt. Calley actually knew the order under which he asserts he operated was unlawful, the fact that the order was given operates as no defense.
Unless you find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted with
-actual knowledge that the order was unlawful, you must proceed to
determine whether, under the circumstances, a man of ordinary sense
and understanding would have known the order was unlawful. Your
-deliberations on the question do not focus solely on Lt. Calley and the
manner in which he perceived the legality of the order found to have
been given him. The standard is that of a man of ordinary sense and
understanding under the circumstances.
Think back to the events of 15 and 16 March 1968. Consider all the
information which you find to have been given Lt. Calley at the company briefing, at the platoon leaders' briefing, and during his conversation with Captain Medina before lift-off. Consider the gunship "prep"
and any artillery he may have observed. Consider all the evidence which
you find indicated what he could have heard and observed as he entered
and made his way through the village to the point where you find him
to have first acted causing the deaths of occupants, if you find him to
have so acted. Consider the situation which you find facing him at that
point. Then determine, in light of all the surrounding circumstances,
whether the order, which to reach this point you will have found him to
be operating in accordance with, is one which a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be unlawful. Apply this to each charged
act which you have found Lt. Calley to have committed. Unless you
are satisfied from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that a man
of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the order to
be unlawful, you must acquit Lt. Calley for committing acts done in
accordance with the order.
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